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Vaccination Equity by Design
Kristen Underhill & Olatunde C.A. Johnson
abstract. This Essay examines how states’ initial COVID-19 vaccine-distribution strategies
tended to disadvantage populations of color, including Black, Latinx, and Native American communities. These dynamics resonate with “inverse equity” effects of other public-health innovations. We argue for a federal regulatory framework to reduce inequity-forcing effects during initial
vaccine rollout.
introduction
Racial disparities in COVID-19 exposure, cases, and outcomes have been a
salient feature of the U.S. pandemic. From its earliest days in 2020, COVID-19
transmission skyrocketed in Black, Latinx, and Native American communities.
Members of these populations have been two to three times more likely to be
hospitalized and more than twice as likely to die from COVID-19 as white, nonHispanic people.1
As 2020 came to an end, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began to
approve vaccine candidates for emergency use. 2 Plans for vaccination rollout
sparked optimism that the pandemic—and the disproportionate burdens it had

1.

2.
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See Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(May 26, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigationsdiscovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/P8A9-X4B9].
See FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19 by Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for
First COVID-19 Vaccine: Action Follows Thorough Evaluation of Available Safety, Effectiveness,
and Manufacturing Quality Information by FDA Career Scientists, Input from Independent Experts,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-ﬁght-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-ﬁrst-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/3KZC-7YNF] (announcing issuance of emergencyuse authorization for Pﬁzer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine).
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placed on communities of color—was coming to an end. In the short term, however, optimism about the equity-promoting effects of COVID-19 vaccination
was misplaced. In mid-March 2021, surveillance data from forty-four states revealed “a consistent pattern” of lower vaccination rates in communities of color.3
At the national level, data trends showed much of the same: by July 2021, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that of the ﬁftyseven percent of vaccine recipients for whom race was known, sixty-one percent
were white, ﬁfteen percent were Latinx, and just nine percent were Black.4 For
Black populations nationwide and in most reporting states,5 rates of vaccination
during the initial vaccine-rollout period were lower than the rates of adverse effects from the disease.
These data were no surprise to public-health scholars of the “inverse equity
hypothesis.”6 This theory predicts that when health innovations emerge, they are
initially adopted by wealthy and connected segments of the population, thereby
amplifying rather than reducing inequality. 7 COVID-19 vaccination is a case
study, characterized by greater uptake in U.S. counties with higher socioeconomic status, lower proportions of racial and ethnic minorities or limited-Eng-

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

54

Nambi Ndugga, Latoya Hill & Samantha Artiga, Latest Data on COVID-19 Vaccinations by
Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid
-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-race-ethnicity
[https://perma.cc
/L4GG-SNBF].
See COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 30, 2021), https:
//covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccination-demographic [https://perma.cc/CHE398LQ] (reporting raw data on known characteristics of vaccine recipients). Many jurisdictions have only limited data on the distribution of vaccines by recipient race and ethnicity. See
Elizabeth M. Painter et al., Demographic Characteristics of Persons Vaccinated During the First
Month of the COVID-19 Vaccination Program, 70 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 174
(2021), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7005e1.htm [https://perma.cc
/PL8D-CA6J]. But where data exist, they are consistent in showing a disproportionate ﬂow
of vaccines to white people despite a lower share of COVID-19 cases and deaths in this group.
Ndugga et al., supra note 3.
Ndugga et al., supra note 3.
Cesar Gomes Victoria, Gary Joseph, Inacio C.M. Silva, Fatima S. Maia, J. Patrick Vaughan,
Fernando C. Barros & Aluisio J.D. Barros, The Inverse Equity Hypothesis: Analyses of Institutional
Deliveries, 286 National Surveys, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 464 (2018). For an early application
of this idea to COVID-19 vaccination, see Adam Todd & Clare Bambra, Learning from Past
Mistakes? The COVID-19 Vaccine and the Inverse Equity Hypothesis, 31 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 2
(2021).
Victoria et al., supra note 6, at 464 (“We postulate that new interventions will initially reach
those of higher socioeconomic status and only later affect the poor.”).
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lish-proﬁciency residents, and greater access to quality housing and transportation.8 These dynamics are part of a familiar pattern, in which socially vulnerable
communities—particularly communities of color—already carry a larger proportion of illness and death.9 Vaccines are like other health innovations: they initially widen the gap between the rich and poor. And although these inequalityexacerbating effects tend to abate once there is near-universal access,10 this is no
consolation for the communities who experience greater morbidity and mortality in the meantime.
The inverse equity effect of COVID-19 vaccination is predictable, but not
inevitable: early vaccine access depends on the design of distribution systems,
and these systems can (and should) account for equity concerns early on. Indeed,
designers of distribution systems like the CDC and state departments of health
had tools to mitigate inverse equity effects from the beginning of the vaccinerollout period. The progress of vaccination in the United States has been complex, with heterogeneous state distribution programs prioritizing equity, including racial equity, differently.11 At the federal level, regulatory efforts to promote
vaccination equity have been incomplete,12 which contributes to the haphazard
and often belated efforts to expand vaccine access to the racial groups most at
risk.

8.

See Michelle M. Hughes et al., County-Level COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage and Social Vulnerability—United States, December 14, 2020-March 1, 2021, 70 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 431 (2021) (reporting vaccination rates by the social vulnerability index, which includes
poverty rates, income, unemployment, household density, and disability).
9. There are important qualiﬁcations to this racial- and ethnic-disparity data. States collect data
differently, and a February 2021 analysis found that racial and ethnic data were absent for
nearly half of those vaccinated. See Rebecca Cooper, Ariella Levisohn & Jill Rosenthal, States
Identify and Address COVID-19 Vaccine Disparities Through Targeted Rollout and Outreach, NAT’L
ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.nashp.org/states-identify-andaddress-covid-19-vaccine-disparities-through-targeted-rollout-and-outreach
[https://
perma.cc/6DAM-NND4].
10. Todd & Bambra, supra note 6.
11. See State Plans for Vaccinating Their Populations Against COVID-19, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE
HEALTH POL’Y (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.nashp.org/each-states-plan-for-vaccinating-itspopulations-against-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/GGM5-25Z4] (identifying how different
states prioritized particular populations in each phase of vaccine distribution); Harald
Schmidt, Rebecca Weintraub, Michelle A. Williams, Kate Miller, Alison Buttenheim, Emily
Sadecki, Helen Wu, Aditi Doiphode, Neha Nagpal, Lawrence O. Gostin & Angela A. Shen,
Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccines in the United States, 27 NATURE MED. 1298 (2021)
(mapping states’ use of different metrics and allocation strategies to promote equity in vaccine
distribution).
12. See infra Part II (describing state and federal policy choices in vaccine distribution).
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In this Essay, we identify policy drivers of racial inequity in early access to
the COVID-19 vaccine, including health-system infrastructure, physical distribution channels, opt-in and demand-based signups, access to information and
distribution platforms, and justiﬁed medical mistrust. We then offer a regulatory
framework for addressing inequity in vaccine allocation and distribution. Building on literature from behavioral economics, public health, and civil rights, this
Essay advocates for the use of federal regulatory tools to counter inverse equity
effects from the start of vaccine rollouts. These tools are designed to encourage
delivery mechanisms involving trusted local organizations, opt-out systems to
supplement or replace demand-based enrollment strategies, and “targeted universalism” 13 priorities that broaden access to more disadvantaged individuals
within priority populations. Although state governments take the lead in designing U.S. vaccine-distribution strategies, we prioritize federal regulatory tools because they have nationwide applicability and have not been used to their fullest
in the COVID-19 vaccine rollout.
We focus on vaccine equity on the basis of race and ethnicity in the United
States. In a pandemic context, equitable or “fair” distribution of vaccines could
be deﬁned in multiple ways. Most conceptions of equitable distribution suggest
that vaccine allocation should track the epidemiological burdens of the COVID19 disease: vaccines should be distributed in proportions that correspond to each
community’s COVID-19-related morbidity and mortality.14 In its weekly Morbidity and Mortality reports, the CDC has deﬁned “vaccine equity” along these
lines: “preferential access and administration to those who have been most affected by COVID-19 disease.”15 This differs from what the CDC has called “vaccine equality,” which is characterized by a “similar allocation of vaccine supply
proportional to . . . [the] population.” 16 Other equity concepts—such as anti-

13.

See John A. Powell, Stephen Menendian & Wendy Ake, Targeted Universalism: Policy & Practice, HAAS INST. (May 2019), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/targeteduniversalism [https://
perma.cc/9MHC-ARU4].
14. See Ndugga et al., supra note 3.
15. Hughes, supra note 8, at 431. Other commentators have focused on the need to prioritize zip
codes most affected by COVID-19. See, e.g., Muriel Jean-Jacques & Howard Bauchner, Vaccine
Distribution—Equity Left Behind?, 325 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 829, 829 (2021); Daniel Salmon,
Douglas J. Opel, Matthew Z. Dudley, Janesse Brewer & Robert Breiman, Reﬂections on Governance, Communication, and Equity: Challenges and Opportunities in COVID-19 Vaccination, 40
HEALTH AFFS. 419, 422 (2021); Kai Kupferschmidt, Global Plan Seeks to Promote Vaccine Equity,
Spread Risks, 369 SCIENCE 489 (2020).
16. Hughes et al., supra note 8, at 431. Some vaccine-distribution programs have used this deﬁnition instead. Maryland, for example, has proposed using the Vaccine Equity Index to track
equity, computed as “the percentage of a racial/ethnic group that has received at least a ﬁrst
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subordination (avoiding “practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups”17) and anticlassiﬁcation (avoiding any practices that
“classify on the basis of race”18)—can provide useful shorthand in discussions of
vaccine equity, but are less responsive (or unresponsive, in the case of anticlassiﬁcation) to the immediate allocation of disease burden.19 We will use “equity” to
refer to vaccine allocation in proportion to the burden of COVID-19 morbidity
and mortality, with a particular focus on racial equity.20
Part I of this Essay introduces the inverse equity hypothesis (IEH) and identiﬁes patterns in early COVID-19 vaccination that appear to show inverse equity
effects. Part II examines the factors driving vaccine disparity and shows how key
design elements of current vaccine-distribution efforts contributed to or failed
to mitigate inequities, relative to alternative designs. Part III draws on civil
rights, behavioral economics, and public-health scholarship to propose federal
regulatory mechanisms to advance equity.
i.

covid-19 vaccination and the inverse equity
hypothesis

The origins of the inverse equity hypothesis lie in a 1971 Lancet article, in
which British physician Julian Tudor Hart introduced the “inverse care law.”21
The “inverse care law” captures the idea that, in a market-based system, “the
availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in

17.
18.
19.

20.

21.

dose divided by the percentage of that racial/ethnic group in the total population.” Andrew
Maul, Kavitha Reddy & Maulik Joshi, Vaccine Equity Index Showed Reduction in Maryland
COVID-19 Vaccination Disparity in Less than Two Months, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Apr.
23, 2021), https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/CAT.21.0126 [https://perma.cc/5UWN
-4YUS].
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassiﬁcation Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472 (2004).
Id. at 1470.
See, e.g., Govind Persad, Monica E. Peek & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Fairly Prioritizing Groups for
Access to COVID-19 Vaccines, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1601 (2020) (“[A] misperception is that
equal concern requires a lottery that gives all recipients identical chances, or chances more
similar than preventing harm and prioritizing the disadvantaged would require. Lotteries are
preferable to ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served or ability-to-pay allocation, which unacceptably exacerbate disadvantage. But lotteries are only acceptable when other considerations are approximately equal, which is vanishingly unlikely with a COVID-19 vaccine.”).
We note here that our concerns and many of our regulatory suggestions may apply well to
other populations at structural disadvantage in the United States. We focus here on racial
equity as one dimension of urgent disparities in health-care access and outcomes, and we include statutes that explicitly target race-based inequities, such as Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. See infra Section III.A.
Julian Tudor Hart, The Inverse Care Law, 297 LANCET 405, 405 (1971).
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the population served.”22 Universal health care through the National Health Service mitigated but did not eliminate this imbalance.23 Hart’s insight has been
duplicated across decades, nations, and health-care sectors.24
The IEH is an unhappy corollary to Hart’s inverse care law. Given inequality
in the use of existing health-care resources, optimists might hope that new healthcare technologies would be allocated in ways that reduce disparities. But this is
rarely achieved.25 Studies of innovations as varied as heart surgeries,26 immunizations, HIV treatment, dental-cavity prevention, hospital births, vitamin supplements, and safe water have demonstrated that advances in health-care ﬂow
ﬁrst to wealthy people, exacerbating rather than reducing disparities.27
According to the IEH, new interventions amplify inequality in a predictable
pattern. Early in the diffusion of a new technology, such as a vaccine, wealthy
people are early adopters.28 As diffusion expands, demand among wealthier and
middle-income people becomes saturated, while the poorest people slowly begin
to gain access. Eventually, this delay in access drives persistent disparities to the

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

27.

28.
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Id. Hart described variations in all-cause and infant mortality by social class throughout the
United Kingdom, demonstrating striking disparities favoring wealthier groups.
Michael Marmot, An Inverse Care Law for Our Time, 362 BRIT. MED. J. k3216 (2018); Graham
Watt, The Inverse Care Law Today, 360 LANCET 252, 252 (2002).
Marmot, supra note 23, at k3216; see also Richard Cookson, Tim Doran, Miqdad Asaria, Indrani Gupta & Fiorella Parra Mujica, The Inverse Care Law Re-Examined: A Global Perspective,
397 LANCET 828, 828 (2021) (ﬁnding that the inverse care law “persists in almost all low-income and middle-income countries, whereby socially disadvantaged people receive less, and
lower-quality, health care despite having greater need”). Cookson et al. extend this idea to the
“disproportionate care law” prevalent in richer countries, in which disadvantaged people may
receive more care than the wealthy, but that this care is lower quality and insufficient to meet
poor people’s heightened burden of illness. Cookson et al., supra, at 828-29.
See Cesar G. Victoria, J.P. Vaughan, F.C. Barros, A.C. Silva & E. Tomasi, Explaining Trends in
Inequalities: Evidence from Brazilian Child Health Studies, 356 LANCET 1093, 1093 (2000).
See Rosemary J. Korda, Mark S. Clements & Jane Dixon, Socioeconomic Inequalities in the Diffusion of Health Technology: Uptake of Coronary Procedures as an Example, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED.
224, 224 (2011).
See Victoria et al., supra note 6; see also Cesar G. Victoria, Bridget Fenn, Jennifer Bryce & Betty
R. Kirkwood, Co-Coverage of Preventive Interventions and Implications for Child-Survival Strategies: Evidence from National Surveys, 366 LANCET 1460, 1460, 1463-64 (2005) (reviewing primary sources showing the distribution of other innovations mentioned above).
This produces what is called “top inequality,” where the wealthiest gain more rapidly than all
other groups. Victoria et al., supra note 6, at 464. Some of the more fascinating demonstrations of the inverse equity hypothesis (IEH) are where a health-care practice is initially thought
to be helpful (and is taken up quickly by the wealthy), but where subsequent research shows
that it is in fact harmful, such as using C-sections without medical need or refusing the MMR
vaccine. Id.
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detriment of the most disadvantaged.29 Vaccines and other innovations thus aggravate inequality when they are ﬁrst introduced. It is only later, when coverage
is widespread and the wealthy have extracted their full beneﬁt, that expanding
access to the innovation can narrow health-status gaps between the rich and the
poor.30
In the United States, the health gap between the rich and poor tracks
longstanding racial disparities in wealth and health care that disadvantage people of color.31 Racial disparities in health care reﬂect not only structural racism
(e.g., socioeconomic exclusion, unequal insurance availability, residential segregation, inaccessibility of health-care facilities, and exposure to incarceration32),
but also explicit and implicit racial biases among care providers.33 As applied to
the United States, the dynamics of the IEH reﬂect not only rapid demand for
new innovations among wealthier and whiter patients, but also inadequate supply of new innovations among patients of color due to institutional and interpersonal racism, even when socioeconomic status is held constant.

29.

30.

31.

32.
33.

Id. at 467 (“[A]bsolute inequalities in population coverage . . . tend to increase as national
coverage rises to about 50%, and to decline at higher levels of coverage, resulting in an inverted
U-shaped pattern . . . . [I]nequalities will necessarily be small when national coverage is either very low or very high.”); see also John Tayu Lee, Zhilian Huang, Sanjay Basu & Christopher Millett, The Inverse Equity Hypothesis: Does It Apply to Coverage of Cancer Screening in Middle-Income Countries?, 69 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY CMTY. HEALTH 149, 151 (2015) (ﬁnding continued
lack of access to cancer screening in the poorest quintiles of low-income and middle-income
countries).
Victoria et al., supra note 6, at 1093 (“We postulate that new interventions will initially reach
those of higher socioeconomic status and only later affect the poor. This results in an early
increase in inequity ratios for coverage, morbidity, and mortality indicators, followed later by
a reduction when the poor gain greater access to the interventions and the rich reach minimum achievable levels for morbidity and mortality, beyond which there are unlikely to be
substantial further improvements.”). But see, e.g., Martin White, Jean Adams & Peter Heywood, How and Why Do Interventions that Increase Health Overall Widen Inequalities Within
Populations?, SOC. INEQ. & PUB. HEALTH 65, 75 (Salvatore J. Babones ed., 2009) (criticizing
the IEH as overbroad and presenting theoretical alternatives).
See, e.g., Zinzi D. Bailey, Nancy Krieger, Madina Agénor, Jasmine Graves, Natalia Linos &
Mary T. Bassett, Structural Racism and Health Inequities in the USA: Evidence and Interventions,
389 LANCET 1453 (2017) (describing drivers of structural racism in health-care access); Ruqaiijah Yearby, Racial Disparities in Health Status and Access to Healthcare: The Continuation of Inequality in the United States Due to Structural Racism, 77 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1113 (2018).
See Bailey et al., supra note 31 (reviewing pathways between structural racism and adverse
health outcomes for people of color).
Id. at 1456; William J. Hall, Mimi V. Chapman, Kent M. Lee, Yesenia M. Merino, Tainayah
W. Thomas, B. Keith Payne, Eugenia Eng, Steven H. Day & Tamera Coyne-Beasley, Implicit
Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals and Its Inﬂuence on Health Care Outcomes:
A Systematic Review, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 60 (2015).
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Pre-exposure prophylaxis medication, which prevents HIV infection among
people who are HIV-negative, provides a case study. Access has lagged among
Black individuals despite the elevated burden of HIV infection among people of
color, 34 and implicit racial bias likely contributes to this effect. 35 Many other
studies show lagging access among people of color to health-care technologies,
including cancer screenings, 36 seasonal ﬂu vaccination, 37 pediatric care, 38 and
organ transplantation.39
Experiences with racism in health care have also prompted justiﬁed mistrust
among populations of color in the United States,40 particularly given the exploitation of Black people by the medical system since slavery.41 Much of the scholarship on medical mistrust cites to awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,
which withheld penicillin from low-income Black men until as late as 1972 in
order to observe the long-term effects of syphilis infection.42 But medical exploitation and neglect of Black communities long predates the events of Tuskegee,
and ongoing experiences of discrimination reinforce the view that the health-

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.
39.
40.

41.

42.
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See Bisola O. Ojikutu, Laura M. Bogart, Molly Higgins-Biddle, Sannisha K. Dale, Wanda Allen, Tiffany Dominique & Kenneth H. Mayer, Facilitators and Barriers to Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) Use Among Black Individuals in the United States: Results from the National Survey
on HIV in the Black Community, 22 AIDS & BEHAV. 3576 (2018).
Sarah K. Calabrese, Valerie A. Earnshaw, Kristen Underhill, Nathan B. Hansen & John F.
Dovidio, The Impact of Patient Race on Clinical Decisions Related to Prescribing HIV Pre-Exposure
Prophylaxis (PrEP), 18 AIDS & BEHAV. 226 (2014).
Arica White, Trevor D. Thompson, Mary C. White, Susan A. Sabatino, Janet de Moor, Paul
V. Doria-Rose, Ann M. Geiger & Lisa C. Richardson, Cancer Screening Test Use—United States,
2015, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 201 (2017).
See Anna Rouw, Adam Wexler, Lindsey Dawson, Jennifer Kates & Samantha Artiga, State
Variation in Seasonal Flu Vaccination: Implications for a COVID-19 Vaccine, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/state-variation-inseasonal-ﬂu-vaccination-implications-for-a-covid-19-vaccine
[https://perma.cc/33GVWAMP].
See Glenn Flores, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Health and Health Care of Children, 125
PEDIATRICS 979 (2010).
See Rhiannon D. Reed & Jayme E. Locke, Social Determinants of Health: Going Beyond the Basics
to Explore Racial Disparities in Kidney Transplantation, 104 TRANSPLANTATION 1324 (2020).
See Jessica Jaiswal & Perry N. Halkitis, Towards a More Inclusive and Dynamic Understanding of
Medical Mistrust Informed by Science, 45 BEHAV. MED. 79 (2019); Kimberly D. Manning, The
Art of Medicine: More than Medical Mistrust, 396 LANCET 1481 (2020); Lillie D. Williamson,
Marisa A. Smith & Cabral A. Bigman, Does Discrimination Breed Mistrust?, 24 J. HEALTH
COMMC’N 791 (2019).
See generally HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2008)
(documenting centuries of medical exploitation of Black people in the United States).
Id. at 80.
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care system acts against the health interests of Black people.43 Prior work has
found that mistrust can cause delays in seeking care and reduced adherence to
treatment, and that experiences of health-care discrimination can augment this
mistrust.44 In these ways, justiﬁed medical mistrust can present an additional
access barrier to new health-care technologies among people of color, and it is
likely to affect vaccination access in the COVID-19 context.45
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated novel medical interventions, including tests, treatments, and vaccines. With many of these innovations, patterns of uptake in the United States and elsewhere have been consistent with the
IEH.46 In some countries, and on a global scale, this manifests in socioeconomic
disparities driven by early access for the wealthy, followed by lagging access for
the most disadvantaged.47 In the United States, the IEH also reﬂects racial disparities, demonstrated by early access for whiter (and wealthier) communities,

43.
44.

45.

46.

47.

Id.
Dayna Bowen Matthew, Legal Battles Against Discrimination in Healthcare, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 167, 172 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William M.
Sage eds., 2017).
See Hayley S. Thompson et al., Factors Associated with Racial/Ethnic Group-Based Medical Mistrust and Perceptions on COVID-19 Vaccine Trial Participation and Vaccine Uptake in the US, 4 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N NETWORK OPEN (May 27, 2021), https://jamanetwork.com/journals
/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2780402 [https://perma.cc/VEX9-M2Q8]. We use the phrase
“justiﬁed medical mistrust” to emphasize that the institutions that create or reinforce mistrust
should bear the burden of correcting these barriers, rather than the communities that experience discrimination. See Jaiswal & Halkitis, supra note 40, at 81 (“Medical mistrust, and conspiracy beliefs in particular, have been conceptualized as a ‘cultural barrier,’ insinuating that
such mistrust is a characteristic of populations of color in the United States. This framing is
problematic and likely racist in that it situates the onus to overcome medical mistrust on the
population experiencing structural, social, political, and economic exclusion and marginalization, rather than the institutions and entities that have created environments that engender
mistrust and sustain institutionalized inequalities.”).
See Ndugga et al., supra note 3, ﬁg.4 (reporting vaccination by race in the United States from
March through September 2021, and showing the predictable IEH pattern of initially small
inequalities at the moment of ﬁrst rollout, followed by increased disparities between the proportions of white and Black recipients, followed by narrowing disparities in later phases of
rollout); Anna Rouw, Adam Wexler, Jennifer Kates & Josh Michaud, Tracking Global COVID19 Vaccine Equity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. ﬁgs.1 & 5 (July 21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/tracking-global-covid-19-vaccine-equity
[https://perma.cc
/RQ72-QWGT] (demonstrating inequality in vaccine distribution on the basis of countrylevel income, with sharp rises in equality driven by high-income country behavior in the
months after vaccine approval).
This is true in other countries as well as globally. See, e.g., Julien Riou, Radoslaw Panczak,
Christian L. Althaus, Christoph Junker, Damir Perisa, Katrin Schneider, Nicola G Criscuolo,
Nicola Low & Matthias Egger, Socioeconomic Position and the COVID-19 Care Cascade from Testing to Mortality in Switzerland: A Population-Based Analysis, LANCET (July 9, 2021), https://
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with lagging access for communities of color. From the start, racial disparities in
infection have been striking, as have disparities in hospitalization, with people
of color more likely to be exposed, infected, and hospitalized.48 Among hospitalized patients, several U.S. studies have shown no racial disparities in mortality,
suggesting similar outcomes once patients access hospital care.49 But these ﬁndings focus exclusively “on individuals able to access hospital care,”50 and racial
disparities persist for access to many hospital services.51
Overall, U.S. data have shown that white individuals have accessed COVID19 vaccination at rates that exceed their share of cases, while Black and Latinx
individuals have been vaccinated at lower rates.52 In the ﬁrst month of vaccine

48.

49.

50.
51.

52.

62

www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(21)00160-2/fulltext [https://
perma.cc/8Z49-4EYV]; Julien Riou, Radoslaw Panczak, Christian L. Althaus, Christoph Junker, Damir Perisa, Katrin Schneider, Nicola G. Criscuolo, Nicola Low & Matthias Egger, Socioeconomic Position and the Cascade from SARS-CoV-2 Testing to COVID-19 Morality: Analysis
of Nationwide Surveillance Data (2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://osf.io/m75vp
[https://perma.cc/42F8-AEDQ] (ﬁnding disparities in testing based on socioeconomic status); Anna Rouw, Adam Wexler, Jennifer Kates & Josh Michaud, Global COVID-19 Vaccine
Access: A Snapshot of Inequality, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.kff.org
/policy-watch/global-covid-19-vaccine-access-snapshot-of-inequality
[https://perma.cc
/V9EY-GLAZ] (documenting access to COVID-19 vaccination on the basis of national income).
Clyde W. Yancy, COVID-19 and African Americans, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1891 (2020); Don
Bambino Geno Tai, Aditya Shah, Chyke A. Doubeni, Irene G. Sia & Mark L. Wieland, The
Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Racial and Ethnic Minorities in the United States, 72
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 703 (2021); COVID-19 Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html [https://
perma.cc/T86F-VM5W].
See, e.g., Baligh R. Yehia, Angela Winegar, Richard Fogel, Mohamad Fakih, Allison Ottenbacher, Christine Jesser, Angelo Bufalino, Ren-Huai Huang & Joseph Cacchione, Association
of Race with Mortality Among Patients Hospitalized with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
at 92 US Hospitals, 3 J. AM. MED. ASS’N NETWORK OPEN (2020).
Id. at 8.
See, e.g., Ben Harder, Ronan Corgel & Tavia Binger, Analysis of Racial Gaps in Hospital Care,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 27, 2021), https://health.usnews.com/health-news/blogs
/second-opinion/articles/2021-07-27/analysis-of-racial-gaps-in-hospital-care
[https://
perma.cc/Z5EH-5MA3] (describing results of an equity analysis of the publication’s bestranked hospitals during 2015-2019; noting that “racial and ethnic minorities are underrepresented among patients who access many common services” at approximately four out of ﬁve
hospitals, and that fewer than one-third of hospitals “treated a proportion of Black patients
that was comparable to or higher than the proportion of Black residents in the community”).
Ndugga et al., supra note 3.
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availability, sixty percent of recipients were white, in part due to overall demographics in the prioritized population of health-care personnel.53 But inequitable burdens persist within priority populations. For example, among healthcare personnel, a majority of deaths were among people of color, including Black,
Latinx, and Asian care workers.54 Some studies have documented higher rates of
vaccine hesitancy among Black populations, linked to justiﬁable medical mistrust.55 However, disparities are present even among people who reported that
they were willing to be vaccinated, 56 which is an important note given many
other differences between people willing and unwilling to receive the vaccine in
the United States.57 Racial disparities are one part of overall disparities on the
basis of social vulnerability and community disadvantage,58 and ﬁndings from
December 2020 through April 2021 show that disparities on the basis of social
vulnerability increased as vaccine eligibility expanded to include more categories
of people.59
These ﬁndings are discouraging. But not all health-care diffusion follows the
inverse equity path. Governments, health-care systems, and providers can roll
out innovations in ways that deliberately reduce inequality from the earliest

53.
54.

55.

56.
57.

58.
59.

Painter et al., supra note 4, at 174.
See Samantha Artiga, Matthew Rae, Olivia Pham, Liz Hamel & Cailey Muñana, COVID-19
Risks and Impacts Among Health Care Workers by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 11,
2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/covid-19-risks-impacts-health-care-workers-race-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/KD85-RYMN]; see also Our Key
Findings About US Healthcare Worker Deaths in the Pandemic’s First Year, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8,
2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2020/dec/22/lost-on-thefrontline-our-ﬁndings-to-date [https://perma.cc/SJ89-MP2Z] (ﬁnding that nearly sixtyfour percent of health-care worker deaths in the United States were among people of color).
See Lauren Bunch, A Tale of Two Crises: Addressing COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy as Promoting
Racial Justice, 33 HEC F. 143, 146-49 (2021); Amyn A. Malik, SarahAnn M. McFadden, Jad
Elharake & Saad B. Omer, Determinants of COVID-19 Vaccine Acceptance in the US, 26 ECLINICAL MED. 100495, 100497-99 (2020).
See Long H. Nguyen et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy and
Uptake (Feb. 28, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with authors).
See, e.g., Paul L. Reiter, Michael L. Pennell & Mira L. Katz, Acceptability of a COVID-19 Vaccine
Among Adults in the United States: How Many People Would Get Vaccinated?, 38 VACCINE 6500
(2020); Cheryl Lin, Pikuei Tu & Leslie M. Beitsch, Conﬁdence and Receptivity for COVID-19
Vaccines: A Rapid Systematic Review, 9 VACCINES 16 (2021).
See Hughes et al., supra note 8, at 431.
Vaughan Barry et al., Patterns in COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage, by Social Vulnerability and
Urbanicity, United States, 70 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 818, 818 (2021).

63

the yale law journal forum

September 18, 2021

stages.60 Researchers have sought to identify the features of health-care innovations that lead to inequality-amplifying initial effects. For example, systems using voluntary opt-in approaches can increase inequality, as opposed to opt-out
or mandatory policies. 61 This is true for COVID-19 vaccination distribution,
which requires individuals to actively seek out the vaccine, rather than defaulting
to vaccination (i.e., requiring opt-outs). In contrast, interventions that speciﬁcally target vulnerable populations—or the use of multiple delivery options—can
mitigate inverse equity effects.62 These include, for example, offering ﬁnancial
incentives, reducing ﬁnancial or access barriers, or speciﬁcally tailoring interventions to disadvantaged groups.63
COVID-19 has revealed continuing sources of race-based disadvantage in
access to health-care innovations. We now turn to the distribution choices that
shaped inverse equity effects in U.S. vaccine distribution.
ii.

choosing inequitable vaccine distribution

Key elements of the early design and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines
contributed to racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in initial access. As

60.

Cesar Victoria et al., who originally generated the IEH, have also noted early successes in equitable distribution of vitamin A treatment for children, HIV treatment, institutional birth
support, and ﬂu vaccination prioritizing high-mortality populations. Victoria et al., supra note
6, at 464-65.
61. See White et al., supra note 30, at 71 (“A common attribute of interventions that lead to increased socio-economic inequalities in health appears to be a reliance on voluntary behaviour
change.” (citing David Mechanic, Disadvantage, Inequality, and Social Policy, 21 HEALTH AFFS.
48, 48-59 (2002))).
62. Victoria et al., supra note 6, at 464-65.
63. Id. at 469 (offering strategies such as providing free services in needy areas, adjusting some
interventions to allow for preferred local practices, and planning rollout such that “all interventions should be initially deployed in the neediest areas”). Financial incentives for individual vaccine uptake may be part of the solution, but it will not solve access problems more
generally. See, e.g., Kevin G. Volpp & Carolyn C. Cannuscio, Incentives for Immunity – Strategies
for Incentivizing Covid-19 Vaccine Uptake, 385 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 381 (2021) (aggregating examples of state ﬁnancial-incentives programs for vaccination and emphasizing that “though a
well-designed incentive program could boost vaccination rates in the short term, there are
likely to be signiﬁcant hiccups in implementation”); Rebeca Carmo de Souza Cruz, Leides
Barroso Azevedo de Moura & Joaquim José Soares Neto, Conditional Cash Transfers and the
Creation of Equal Opportunities for Health for Children in Low and Middle-Income Countries: A
Literature Review, 167 INT’L J. EQUITY HEALTH 161 (reviewing studies ﬁnding that cash ﬁnancial incentives can improve childhood vaccination but noting that “cash transfers
alone . . . may not be able to mitigate poverty and health inequalities in the presence of poor
health services”).
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the IEH predicts, as supply of the vaccine has expanded, disparities have narrowed.64 Yet early differences in vaccination meant that illness and hospitalization rates remained higher in communities of color and low-income communities well after vaccines became available. 65 In addition, racial and ethnic
disparities in vaccination rates have persisted months after the initial authorization of the vaccine, particularly as measured against COVID-19 deaths.66 These
disparities will reverberate beyond the current pandemic because they are missed
opportunities to strengthen public-health systems and to increase trust within
underserved communities.
After emergency-use authorization of the Pﬁzer and Moderna vaccines in late
2020, federal regulators needed to tackle the difficult logistical, health, and ethical dimensions of providing access to what was still then a scarce resource. From
the outset, federal regulators built in equity considerations when planning for
vaccine rollout. The CDC announced its initial guidelines (developed by its Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP)) in late 2020 and early 2021.
The ACIP was explicit about its goal of reducing disparities given the extensive
data on the racial and ethnic distribution of those most affected by COVID-19,
as well “inequities in social determinants of health that are linked to COVID-19
risk.”67 Accordingly, an announced goal of the vaccine-allocation framework was
to reduce and not exacerbate disparities. 68 The guidelines therefore recommended prioritizing access to individuals at high risk because of their age, nature
of employment, conﬁnement in long-term care facilities, and medical risk.69 Although this phasing-in system indirectly prioritized many individuals of color by
64.

65.

66.
67.

68.
69.

See Ndugga et al., supra note 3 (“CDC data also show that recent vaccinations are reaching
larger shares of Hispanic and Black populations compared to overall vaccinations.”); sources
cited supra note 46.
See, e.g., Carla K. Johnson, Olga R. Rodriguez & Angeliki Kastanis, As US COVID-19 Death
Toll Nears 600,000, Racial Gaps Persist, AP NEWS (June 14, 2021), https://apnews.com/article
/baltimore-california-coronavirus-pandemic-race-and-ethnicity-health341950a902affc651dc268dba6d83264 [https://perma.cc/YFZ4-25EV] (reporting in June
2021—six months after vaccines received authorization—that Black and Latinx populations
continued to experience greater mortality from COVID-19 compared to other groups, and
noting lower rates of vaccination as a possible contributing cause).
See Ndugga et al., supra note 3.
Nancy McClung et al., The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’ Ethical Principles for
Allocating Initial Supplies of COVID-19 Vaccine—United States, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1782, 1783 (Nov. 27, 2020) (“Efforts should be made to identify and remove
obstacles and barriers to receiving COVID-19 vaccine, including limited access to health care
or residence in rural, hard-to-reach areas.”).
Id.
On December 1, 2020, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP) recommended that health-care personnel and residents of long-term care facilities be offered
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listing high-risk workers, essential workers,70 and those at high medical risk, the
guidelines did not explicitly list race, ethnic, or socioeconomic considerations in
their allocation plans. 71 These guidelines were not binding on states, though
most states used key aspects of the CDC framework in designing their own distribution systems.72
Despite this early attention to equity considerations at the federal level and
in many states, the ﬁrst phase of vaccine distribution efforts did not avoid the
inverse equity trap. Instead, ambiguity in the CDC guidance and the initial distribution decisions made by many states likely contributed to race- and ethnicity-based inverse equity effects. Governments rightly sought to distribute the
vaccine rapidly, but they missed opportunities to mitigate racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic inequities.73 The tendency by most jurisdictions in the initial distribution stages to rely heavily on opt-in, demand-based vaccine sign-ups, which
depended on information and technology infrastructures that were already inequitably distributed, was a critical mistake. These systems interacted detrimentally with longstanding disparities in access to health care and technology like

70.

71.
72.

73.

66

COVID-19 vaccination ﬁrst, in Phase 1a of the vaccination program. Then, on December 20,
2020, ACIP recommended that in Phase 1b, the vaccine should be offered to individuals over
seventy-ﬁve years of age, and an expanded set of frontline essential workers. In Phase 1c, individuals sixty-ﬁve to seventy-four years of age, those with high-risk medical conditions, and
other essential workers should be offered the vaccine. See Kathleen Dooling, Mona Marin,
Megan Wallace, Nancy McClung, Mary Chamberland, Grace M. Lee, H. Keipp Talbot, José
R. Romero, Beth P. Bell & Sara E. Oliver, The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’
Updated Interim Recommendation for Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine—United States, December
2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1657 (Jan. 1, 2021).
People of color are overrepresented in essential occupations (frontline industries) in the
United States; a 2020 analysis found that before the pandemic, Black people constituted 12%
of all workers but 17% of workers in frontline industries. Hye Jin Rho, Hayley Brown &
Shawn Fremstad, A Basic Demographic Proﬁle of Workers in Frontline Industries, CTR. FOR ECON.
& POL’Y RSCH. tbl.1 (Apr. 2020), https://cepr.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020-04Frontline-Workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY79-P6M7].
See Dooling et al., supra note 69.
See id. (describing guidelines as “guidance” and “recommendations” for jurisdictions); State
Covid-19 Vaccine Priority Populations, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.kff
.org/other/state-indicator/state-covid-19-vaccine-priority-populations
[https://perma.cc
/5LUZ-MP7T]; see also Dep’t Health, Plan Announced for Next Phase of Covid-19 Vaccine Distribution, R.I. GOV’T (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.ri.gov/press/view/40307 [https://perma.cc
/M8GN-S26Y] (listing states that following ACIP guidance and those instances in which
states deviated).
See Cooper et al., supra note 9 (noting that federal and state officials sought to balance quick
vaccination with the need to vaccinate the most vulnerable communities, and that “[s]tate
officials note that balancing speed and equity is one of the biggest challenges they face”).
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broadband internet.74 The heavy reliance on online opt-in systems predictably
increased barriers to accessing the vaccine for communities of color, adding to
the obstacles already posed by justiﬁed mistrust in health-care systems.75
The remainder of this Part will consider three categories of choices that contributed to inverse equity effects: (A) decisions about the speciﬁcity of federal
regulatory guidance, (B) state and local decisions to use demand-based and
sometimes resource-intensive sign-up systems, and (C) decisions to centralize
vaccine distribution in particular geographical locations and institutions.
A. Gaps in the CDC Guidance
First, the CDC prioritization guidelines excluded certain high-risk categories. By relying on broad categories of age, work status, and medical risk for initial prioritization, the guidelines effectively excluded additional ways of measuring social and health vulnerability that might have diminished racial and
ethnic impact.76 For instance, the initial guidelines chose not to prioritize communities at high risk or who had suffered high rates of COVID-19 infection and
adverse consequences, many of which were communities of color or low-income
communities.77
Subsequently, several states adopted prioritization strategies that diverged
from the ACIP guidelines. Some states chose to prioritize social vulnerability
differently: by high-risk neighborhoods in Rhode Island,78 by multigenerational

74.

75.

76.
77.
78.

See, e.g., Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/?menuItem=3109350c-8dba-4b7f-ad52a3e976ab8c8f [https://perma.cc/5XHQ-9MV2] (ﬁnding persistent racial gaps in access to a
broadband connection at home, although percentages of adults who say that they use the internet differed little by race in recent years).
See Hayley S. Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 6-9 (ﬁnding that elevated rates of rejection
of COVID-19 vaccine-trial participation and uptake were attributable in part to group-based
medical mistrust).
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See id.
See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 72 (describing the then-forthcoming Phase 2 shift away
from occupation to “age, geography, and high-risk conditions”).
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households in Oregon and Washington,79 and by communities of color (particularly Native American communities) in Montana.80 By the late winter and early
spring, as vaccine supply increased, some states targeted particular neighborhoods to reach communities that were most affected by the pandemic, but that
had lower vaccination rates relative to the general population.81 This response,
while likely helpful, has made visible the initial design choice not to incorporate
more direct targeting into early-stage guidelines.
With more speciﬁc guidance, the CDC may have prompted more equitable
allocation priorities in state vaccination plans. This guidance could have taken
several forms. One strategy would have been to keep ACIP’s priority categories

79.

Id. National data show that households of color are signiﬁcantly more likely to be multigenerational. ACIP provided data showing that Black and Latino individuals over the age of seventy-ﬁve were more likely to live in multigenerational households. See Dooling et al., supra
note 69.
80. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 72. On April 1, two weeks before vaccinations were open to
all adults in the state, Vermont indicated that it would prioritize Black, Indigenous, and People
of Color (BIPOC) communities for receipt of the vaccine. See Phil Galewitz, Vermont to Give
Minority Residents Vaccine Priority, KHN (Apr. 5, 2021), https://khn.org/news/article/vermont-gives-blacks-and-other-minority-residents-vaccine-priority [https://perma.cc/G4S9Q6J6]. The explicit use of race as a sole factor raised some criticism. Vermont’s Race-Base Vaccine Policy Raises Legal Questions, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2021), https://www.economist.com
/united-states/2021/04/11/vermonts-race-based-vaccine-policy-raises-legal-questions
[https://perma.cc/VES8-KZD4]. Below, we suggest a more cautious approach toward considering race as a factor for outreach and targeting, alongside other indicia of social vulnerability. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
81. See Nambi Ndugga, Samantha Artiga & Olivia Pham, How Are States Addressing Racial Equity
in COVID-19 Vaccine Efforts?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/how-are-states-addressing-racial-equity-in-covid19-vaccine-efforts [https://perma.cc/P8ZZ-8DMA] (describing a range of efforts adopted in
February 2021 to address racial disparities, including opening clinics in high-risk neighborhoods, allowing residents of heavily impacted neighborhoods to have the priority in appointment scheduling, and establishing partnerships with trusted community-based organizations). As an example, in March 2021, New York State moved away from exclusive reliance on
opt-in systems and mass-distribution sites and adopted a range of strategies to address racial
and socioeconomic inequities in vaccine distribution, including developing “pop-up clinics”
in low-income and hard-hit communities, partnering with faith-based institutions, and establishing vaccination centers in public housing projects and senior centers. See Governor
Cuomo Announces 12 Community-Based Pop-Up Vaccination Sites Coming on Line this Week to
Vaccinate 4,000 New Yorkers, N.Y. STATE (Mar. 4. 2021), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news
/governor-cuomo-announces-12-community-based-pop-vaccination-sites-coming-lineweek-vaccinate [https://perma.cc/RJJ7-YKCT] (detailing outreach and targeted efforts to
enhance equity and fairness in vaccine distribution).
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(e.g., employment categories82), but to further prioritize the hardest-hit communities within those groups—a strategy that might be thought of as “nested”
priorities. Several public-health researchers advocated for this strategy early
on,83 based on ﬁndings showing racial and ethnic disparities within priority categories. For example, there has been greater mortality among Black health-care
workers due to workplace conditions, including the shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE).84 A subcommittee of the National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) recommended designs that embedded
priorities even within priority groups—for instance, prioritizing health-care
workers of color or workers operating in high-risk communities.85 These designs, however, were not speciﬁcally recommended by the CDC.86 A survey of
U.S. adults suggests that most people supported approaches tailored to age,
mortality risk, and employment, but the survey did not give participants the option to weigh in on race-based prioritization criteria.87 An allocation mechanism
that maintains universalist priority groups but also targets vulnerabilities within
those groups may be publicly acceptable.
Another more speciﬁc strategy—one also recommended by NASEM in response to a request from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the CDC
to develop a vaccine-allocation strategy for the initial stages of short supply88—

82.

83.

84.
85.

86.

87.

88.

The CDC guidelines suggested that selecting the right employment categories, including occupations disproportionately held by people of color, could address disparate impact. See
Dooling et al., supra note 69 (noting that “certain essential worker groups have high proportions of some racial and ethnic minority groups who have experienced disproportionate
COVID-19 incidence, morbidity, and mortality”).
See Samantha Artiga & Jennifer Kates, Addressing Racial Equity in Vaccine Distribution, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issuebrief/addressing-racial-equity-vaccine-distribution [https://perma.cc/2ABR-C6KE].
See Artiga et al., supra note 54 (showing differential mortality of health-care workers by race).
See Helene D. Gayle & James F. Childress, Race, Racism, and Structural Injustice: Equitable Allocation and Distribution of Vaccines for the COVID-19, 21 AM. J. BIOETHICS 4-7 (2021) (recommending embedding equity in “each phase of the vaccination process” and recommending
“when prioritizing vaccination among health care workers, our efforts must speciﬁcally avoid
prioritizing only highly paid physicians and nurses, but also all others involved in patient care,
such as the other front-line workers who are responsible for transporting patients, providing
therapies, and other roles that require close contact with patients with COVID-19”).
See Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G & MED.
(2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK562672/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK562672.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZPB-BJA].
See Sarah E. Gollust, Brendan Saloner, Robert Hest & Lynn A. Blewett, US Adults’ Preferences
for Public Allocation of a Vaccine for Coronavirus Disease 2019, J. AM. MED. ASS’N NETWORK OPEN
(Sept. 29, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2770976
[https://perma.cc/8GLS-6LTD].
See NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 86, at 2.
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would have been to allocate vaccine priority based on measures of social vulnerability. Elsewhere, the CDC has used the Social Vulnerability Index, a measure
that has predicted disparities in COVID-19 risk, hospitalization, and death and
correlates with race-based disparities.89 NASEM agreed with this measure and
recommended prioritizing geographic areas “identiﬁed as vulnerable through
CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index or another more speciﬁc index” for vaccine access.90 Some states approximated measures of social vulnerability in other ways.
Rhode Island, for example, incorporated measures of hospitalization, death, and
cases to allocate vaccines geographically.91 The state pinpointed these locations,
and then made vaccines accessible locally via community clinics, housing, and
pharmacies.92
In addition to these strategies, the CDC could have prompted more equitable
vaccine distribution by explicitly invoking race and ethnicity alongside other indicators of vulnerability, using a more targeted approach. The faith that employment and age-based priority categories would capture the racially disproportionate impact of COVID-19 ignores the lessons of past universalist approaches that
fail to respond to speciﬁc mechanisms of subordination or disadvantage.93 Uni-

89.

90.

91.
92.
93.
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See id. at 8-9. For an investigation of the relationship between social vulnerability and
COVID-19 deaths, see Sage J. Kim & Wendy Bostwick, Social Vulnerability and Racial Inequality in Covid-19 Deaths in Chicago, 47 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 509, 509 (2020), which found
“signiﬁcant spatial clusters of social vulnerability and risk factors, both of which are signiﬁcantly associated with the increased COVID-19-related death rates.”
NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 86, at 8-9. Some have also advocated for the use
of the Area Deprivation Index, which uses similar criteria to the Social Vulnerability Index
but does not explicitly factor in race. Harald Schmidt, Lawrence O. Gostin & Michelle A. Williams, Opinion, Is It Lawful and Ethnical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?,
J. AM. MED. ASS’N (Oct. 14, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle
/2771874 [https://perma.cc/YS9M-6X3M].
Cooper et al., supra note 9.
Id.
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2842 (2014) (deﬁning a universalist approach to civil-rights law
“as one that either guarantees a uniform ﬂoor of rights or beneﬁts for all persons or, at least,
guarantees a set of rights or beneﬁts to a broad group of people not deﬁned according to the
identity axes (e.g., race, sex) highlighted by our antidiscrimination laws”); id. at 2859 (noting
that a limitation of universalist approaches is that they “will often address broader problems
of inequality and injustice only by taking for granted, and indeed entrenching, pre-existing
group-based inequalities”); Powell et al., supra note 13, at 5, 10 (providing the example of
Massachusetts’s universal health-insurance programs, which faced an initial exacerbation of
health-insurance disparities, but advanced a framework of “targeted universalism,” in which
“universal goals are established for all groups concerned [and the] strategies developed to
achieve those goals are targeted, based upon how different groups are situated within structures, culture, and across geographies to obtain the universal goal”).
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versalist approaches that are nonspeciﬁc to race will also miss intersectional categories of greater vulnerability—including race and disability or health risk, race
and density, race and place, race and limited English proﬁciency, and others.
When many states moved to age-based categorizations, some commentators94
and state governments realized that these priority groups were not responsive to
the racial disparities in disease burden.95
State or federal allocation plans that use race as the sole factor for prioritizing
access for individuals could draw constitutional challenges.96 And yet, the use of
formally race-neutral criteria, which ignore the distinct role that race and ethnicity has played in disease burden, risks reinforcing disparities in who has access
to vaccines, and fails to acknowledge or address vaccine hesitancy linked to justiﬁed medical mistrust and histories of racial exploitation by the U.S. medical
system. To address this issue, the CDC could explicitly encourage states to attend
to racial inequities and barriers to access faced by communities of color. This
approach would encourage states to address the ways in which trust, language,
insurance, and other factors affect access by people of color. Speciﬁc strategies
should include partnering with neighborhood and nonproﬁt groups, community medical- and social-service providers, or faith-based organizations. As Govind Persad has argued, these community-level strategies that consider the speciﬁc needs of high-risk communities of color are likely to withstand judicial
scrutiny. 97 Given the strong correlation between race and COVID-19 disease
burden in the United States, issuing CDC guidelines explicitly identifying race
as one of multiple indicators of increased vulnerability (and therefore priority)
could prompt states to attend to racial equity as an important aspect of distribution mechanisms.

94.

See Jean-Jacques & Bauchner, supra note 15.
For example, Rhode Island’s guidelines speciﬁed, “[d]isparities also exist by race/ethnicity,
highlighting the importance of a targeted approach that considers underlying factors in communities, such as population density, income, and healthcare access, that create higher risks
for exposure, hospitalization, and death.” See Dep’t Health, supra note 72.
96. See Govind Persad, Allocating Medicine Fairly in an Unfair Pandemic, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1085
(2021) (identifying legal precedents that may complicate the use of race as an explicit factor
in vaccine distribution); Michael Conklin, Racial Preferences in COVID-19 Vaccination: Legal
and Practical Implications, 5 HOW. HUM. & C.R.L. REV. 141 (2021) (considering equal-protection challenges to vaccination-distribution systems); Schmidt et al., supra note 90 (describing
strategies for prioritizing racial minority groups in vaccine distribution).
97. See Persad, supra note 96, at 1097 (arguing that “uses of individual race in medical resource
allocation are . . . much more vulnerable than, policies aiming to increase vaccine access at the
community level in minority communities through targeted outreach, delivery of additional
doses, or geographic priority”).
95.
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Identifying race would also allow the CDC to make more tailored suggestions to address instances where race gives rise to unique access barriers. For example, a universalist approach does not acknowledge or address vaccine hesitancy linked to justiﬁed medical mistrust and histories of racial exploitation by
the U.S. medical system.98 This particular barrier will require access strategies
that explicitly seek to build trust by partnering with neighborhood and nonproﬁt
groups, community medical and social-service providers, or faith-based organizations. A recommendation by the CDC to include race among multiple indicators of vulnerability would prompt states to adopt frameworks that recognize
and address race-speciﬁc barriers to access.
B. Demand-Based Distribution
A second key design choice made at the subnational level by many jurisdictions in the initial stages of vaccine distribution was to use opt-in, demand-based
approaches to distribute vaccine doses. Individuals seeking a vaccine generally
had to register and ﬁnd appointments themselves; the default was no vaccination, and opting in required up-to-date information and access to opt-in systems. In many jurisdictions, individuals had to schedule appointments using the
Internet, rather than via telephone or in-person scheduling or registration, or
walk-in appointments.99 This design choice reﬂected a balance of important con-

98.

In March 2021, a Pew Research survey found racial disparities in intent to vaccinate. See Cary
Funk & Alec Tyson, Growing Share of Americans Say They Plan to Get a COVID-19 Vaccine—or
Already Have, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2021/03
/05/growing-share-of-americans-say-they-plan-to-get-a-covid-19-vaccine-or-already-have
[https://perma.cc/9QAS-YKMG] (ﬁnding that in November 2020, 83% of Asian-Americans,
63% of Latinx, 61% of white people, and 42% of Black Americans indicated that they would
take a COVID-19 vaccine, but that gaps had narrowed with new estimates of 91% of AsianAmericans, 70% of Latinx people, 69% of white people, and 60% of Black Americans).
99. See Valerie G. Press, Megan Huisingh-Scheetz & Vineet M. Arora, Inequities in Technology Contribute to Disparities in COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution, JAMA HEALTH F. (Mar. 19, 2021), https:
//jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2777888
[https://perma.cc
/Y6J8-3C3R] (“[V]accine scheduling has predominantly relied on technology such as mobile
apps and internet portals. Despite ongoing efforts to ensure equity, longstanding systemic
disparities in technology access and literacy are hindering equitable vaccine distribution and
raising bigger questions about how technology disparities may be affecting social and health
disparities.”); Laura Moy & Yael Cannon, How to Build a More Equitable Vaccine Distribution
Technology, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/howto-build-more-equitable-vaccine-distribution-technology [https://perma.cc/G6RJ-E4MH]
(noting that “the digital infrastructure used to set up vaccine appointments has created signiﬁcant obstacles for individuals without certain technical resources” and that “[t]he online
registration processes rolled out state by state are tragically too difficult for most people to
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siderations, including the need for preregistration to verify compliance with narrow eligibility categories, the need to provide formally neutral and transparent
sign-up systems (e.g., a ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-serve system within priority groups),
and the need to ensure that vaccine registration was not imposed in a way that
restricted individual autonomy and choice. But in many jurisdictions, this signup system created access barriers for communities of color.
Many sign-up platforms were complicated for all groups to use, but wealthier and whiter residents had many advantages, including the necessary equipment, broadband infrastructure, knowledge, and time.100 Communities of color,
low-income communities, and rural communities are less likely to have Internet
and broadband, putting them at a fundamental disadvantage. 101 Even widely
publicized voluntarist efforts to increase vaccine access through Twitter and
scheduling bots could not fully address the problem, given that low-income individuals (and those over the age of sixty-ﬁve) are less likely to use social media
platforms.102 As some researchers have pointed out, the vaccine-rollout process
was marked by a sad irony: obtaining a vaccine often required access to technology, rendering lower-income individuals who lacked the necessary technological
infrastructure even more vulnerable to COVID-19.103
Alternative or additional systems such as telephone scheduling, in-person
scheduling, and the deliberate integration of community partners or health systems in distribution could have mitigated some of this disadvantage. In the initial stages of rollout, many jurisdictions did not rely extensively on communitybased organizations or trusted health systems (namely, sources of care that are

100.

101.
102.

103.

handle on their own,” and recommending a range of alternatives including simpler and more
accessible websites, setting aside appointments for high-risk communities, creating walk-in
sites in vulnerable communities, and allowing sign-ups by telephone).
See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 9 (recounting that officials in Washington, D.C. noticed
racial, income, and neighborhood disparities in who was signing up for the vaccine once eligibility was expanded to all those over the age of sixty-ﬁve).
See Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch
.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband [https://perma.cc/KE3U-7LX2].
See Sharon Otterman, N.Y.’s Vaccine Websites Weren’t Working. He Built a New One for $50, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/09/nyregion/vaccine-website-appointment-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/XUV2-8ZN5] (recounting that free websites and vaccine bots that ﬁnd available appointments diminish scheduling difficulties for those who can
access, but still require computer literacy).
See Natalie C. Benda, Tiffany C. Veinot, Cynthia J. Sieck & Jessica S. Ancker, Broadband Internet Access Is a Social Determinant of Health!, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (July 8, 2020), https://ajph
.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305784?journalCode=ajph&
[https://
perma.cc/MH54-UED4].
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less likely to draw medical mistrust, particularly institutions embedded in or operated by local communities, such as neighborhood health centers104) to reach
out to potential patients to assist with preregistration and appointment scheduling. Essentially, these strategies would shift from opt-in to opt-out distribution,
and from state- or city-run platforms to platforms run by organizations with
preexisting credibility and community buy-in.
C. Centralized (Mass) Distribution
A third inequality-amplifying strategy was the overreliance by many states
and localities on centralized vaccination sites for initial vaccine distribution. We
acknowledge that mass vaccination campaigns can and should be an important
part of the pandemic response, but we align with commentators who have noted
that mass vaccination should be carried out with attention to “community acceptance, accessibility, and equity,” including communicating with community
leaders, using call centers to address language barriers, and making transportation and physical access a priority.105 Locating access to COVID-19 vaccination
in large, centralized sites simpliﬁes and speeds up vaccine administration, but
also creates distance and travel barriers for at-risk communities, including communities of color.106 Alternative or additional strategies for distribution could
have mitigated these impacts, as demonstrated by states and localities that
adopted more decentralized or place-based distribution strategies.107 Decentralized distribution strategies that are sensitive to neighborhood characteristics
have the dual advantages of reducing logistical access barriers and potentially
reducing justiﬁed medical mistrust.

104.

See infra notes 108-111 (detailing the role community health partners might play in decreasing
vaccine hesitancy).
105. See Eric Goralnick, Christoph Kaufmann & Atul A. Gawande, Mass Vaccination Sites—An Essential Innovation to Curb the Covid-19 Pandemic, 384 NEW ENG. J. MED e67(1), e67(2) (2021).
106. See Benjamin Rader, Christina M. Astley, Karla Therese L. Sy, Kara Sewalk, Yulin Hswen,
John S. Brownstein & Moritz U. G. Kraemer, Geographic Access to United States SARS-CoV-2
Testing Sites Highlights Healthcare Disparities and May Bias Transmission Estimates, 27 J. TRAVEL
MED. 1, 1 (2020).
107. See Maul et al., supra note 16 (describing Maryland’s efforts to decentralize vaccine distribution by using mobile clinics). Commentators have suggested particular types of organizations,
retail locations, and geographic locations in vaccine-distribution strategies. See, e.g., Judith A.
Chevalier, Jason L. Schwartz, Yihua Su & Kevin R. Williams, Distributional Impacts of Retail
Vaccine Availability (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28835, 2021), https://
www.nber.org/papers/w28835 [https://perma.cc/LNT4-ZN84].
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Distributing the vaccine through decentralized networks of primary-care
providers108—such as community health centers or pharmacies—or in collaboration with trusted community partners could have addressed many place-based
and resource-based access barriers, while simultaneously reducing justiﬁed medical mistrust.109 Community partners with high social capital, formal and informal resources, and social networks—such as housing providers, faith-based organizations, neighborhood health centers, libraries, pharmacies, and family
doctors—can play a crucial role in building trust. 110 Peer-reviewed literature
supports these distribution mechanisms; for example, a recent systematic review
of efforts to reduce vaccine hesitancy has identiﬁed logistical and decentralized
mechanisms that improve uptake of inﬂuenza shots and childhood vaccinations. 111 “Dialogue-based interventions”—interventions that work with community and religious leaders, connect with social mobilization efforts, use social
or mass media, give local care providers communication tools and training, or
push reminders directly to individuals in at-risk areas—showed particular promise, as each of these intervention types was found to increase vaccine uptake.112
Centralized, demand-based distribution systems cannot serve these purposes,
and many were discontinued as early vaccine demand was satisﬁed and the distribution focus shifted to underserved communities.113
The other advantage of decentralized distribution networks, either alongside
or in lieu of mass vaccination sites, is that they build capacity. States that initiate
and strengthen these efforts, particularly actions involving community partners
and care providers (such as community clinics, pharmacies, and health centers),

108.

109.
110.

111.

112.
113.

See Scott Ratzan, Eric C. Schneider, Hilary Hatch & Joseph Cacchione, Missing the Point—
How Primary Care Can Overcome COVID-19 Vaccine “Hesitancy,” 384 NEW ENG. J. MED.
e100(1), e100(1)-(3) (2021).
Id.
Partnering with local leadership and trusted community authorities (trusted messengers) can
build credibility, help tailor messages for local audiences, and develop buy-in. See Emily K.
Brunson, Alison Buttenheim, Saad Omer & Sandra Crouse Quinn, Strategies for Building Conﬁdence in the COVID-19 Vaccines, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G & MED. 7 (Feb. 2021), https://
www.nap.edu/read/26068/chapter/1 [https://perma.cc/6K8B-MQ52].
Caitlin Jarrett, Rose Wilson, Maureen O’Leary, Elisabeth Eckersberger, Heidi J. Larson & the
SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy, Strategies for Addressing Vaccine Hesitancy—A
Systematic Review, 33 VACCINE 4180, 4185-87 (2015).
Id. at 4185.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, With Mass Vaccination Sites Winding Down, It’s All About the ‘Ground
Game,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/us/politics/massvaccination-sites-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/3TWJ-RTUL] (describing closing of
federal- and state-run mass vaccination sites as demand waned and efforts shifted to harder
to reach populations).

75

the yale law journal forum

September 18, 2021

will increase the capacity of these networks to deliver other preventive-care interventions (such as inﬂuenza vaccinations and testing for current and future
diseases). These beneﬁts can outlast the immediate crisis and contribute to lasting increases in health-care access.
iii. equity by design: regulatory tools to avoid inverse
equity effects in times of crisis
The prior Part identiﬁed alternatives or additions to the strategies that the
federal government, states, and localities used to distribute COVID-19 vaccines.
The omission of these elements has broader implications for strengthening the
regulatory infrastructure and advancing public-health equity. State and local
ﬂexibility is essential for a decentralized and tailored approach, given differences
in disease burdens, variation in available resources, and the legitimate advantage
to be gained from experimentation across jurisdictions.
In this Part, we turn to federal law to identify how federal regulators can
encourage (or mandate) vaccine-allocation strategies that would be most effective at reducing inverse equity effects. Federal systems have a comparative advantage in collecting and rapidly analyzing data, publicizing information with
credibility, disseminating expertise through guidance, enforcing civil-rights violations, and supporting information networks. In what follows, we suggest a
mix of hard and soft federal regulatory approaches to avoid inverse equity effects
from the outset.
Throughout this Part, we note that traditional regulatory pacing and deliberation processes are less appropriate in times of widespread infectious disease.
Indeed, this is a key reason why emergency statutes temporarily accord greater
authority to the executive branch, which enables more nimble responses to
emerging threats. 114 Some scholars have proposed rapid policy evaluations,
which would be useful for informing future emergency responses.115 As a practical matter, however, there is very little time to build in an evaluation ex ante in
times of crisis. As an ethical matter, there may be insufficient equipoise—the
equal likelihood that a new intervention will help or harm its target population
compared to the current standard—to use randomized or controlled evaluations.
And as an administrative matter, it may be difficult (or inadvisable) to supply
114.

See Lawrence O. Gostin, Jason W. Sapsin, Stephen P. Teret, Scott Burris, Julie Samia Mair,
James G. Hodge, Jr & Jon S. Vernick, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 288 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 622 (2002); see also Cali Curley & Peter Stanley Federman, State Executive Orders:
Nuance in Restrictions, Revealing Suspensions, and Decisions to Enforce, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 623
(2020) (chronicling executive orders in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic).
115. Colleen V. Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, 104
IOWA L. REV. 2313 (2019).
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different messaging or rules for intervention and control conditions during an
emergency.
But other evaluation designs are possible116 and have contributed much to
the COVID-19 response. We urge federal, state, and local governments to use
these designs to evaluate the equity outcomes of their responses, including inverse equity effects when new preventive or treatment innovations are rolled out.
We now consider ﬁve categories of federal regulatory options that could increase equity from the outset of vaccine rollout, even in times of crisis: (1)
providing speciﬁc guidance regarding equity goals and obligations, (2) providing default equity plans for state adoption, (3) collecting equity outcome data,
(4) publicly disseminating and ranking state equity outcomes, and (5) facilitating information sharing among states.
The framework we suggest below is well within the power of federal authorities. Undoubtedly, the pandemic raised fundamental questions about the role of
federal, state, local governments in regulating public health. The early days of
the pandemic were marked by sharp contestations over distribution of PPE, stayat-home orders, and mask mandates that implicated federalism and localism.
And some have argued that the pandemic demonstrates the need for a more centralized federal authority over public-health emergencies.117 While states have
police power over public health, 118 the speciﬁc recommendations below ﬂow
from the CDC’s and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS)
current statutory and regulatory power over vaccine distribution, interstate disease transmission, data collection, and the conditioning of federal funds to prohibit discrimination.119
A. Equity Directives
Federal systems designers should have attended to race, ethnicity, and social
vulnerability more explicitly in the initial guidance that they issued to states and
localities. There are at least two points in the regulatory framework where federal
agencies might have advanced racial and ethnic equity in the distribution of
116.

These alternatives could include pre-post assessments, regression-discontinuity designs, or
difference-in-difference analyses of jurisdictions that vary due to different states’ policy
choices.
117. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally—The U.S.
Response to COVID-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. e75(1), e75(2)-(3) (2020).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., infra notes 120-122 (detailing agencies’ Title VI authority); see also 42 U.S.C. § 264
(2018) (stating the Surgeon General’s authority to “make and enforce such regulations
as . . . are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases” from foreign countries or across states).
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COVID-19 vaccines. First, as suggested in Part II, the CDC’s allocation guidance
could have recommended that jurisdictions attend to racial and ethnic disparities
within priority groups, and they could have encouraged jurisdictions to prioritize counties or neighborhoods that were socially vulnerable and most affected
by the pandemic.
Second, HHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) should have issued clear
directives under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other relevant civilrights statutes to require states to adopt practices that would have promoted equitable vaccine access.120 Title VI extends to federally funded programs,121 and
the applicability of Title VI and other civil-rights statutes to funding in health
care was recently reinforced by the Affordable Care Act.122 Federal assistance for
the COVID-19 response, including the funds made available to support testing,
vaccination, and treatment, likely would have qualiﬁed as “health program[s] or
activit[ies],” enabling the DOJ or the HHS Office for Civil Rights to enforce Title
VI in state COVID-19 vaccination rollouts.123 Title VI also imposes duties of in-

120.

See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018) (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs). The DOJ is responsible
for coordinating and implementing federal civil-rights laws “prohibiting discriminatory practices in Federal programs and programs receiving federal ﬁnancial assistance.” See Exec. Order
No. 12250, 28 C.F.R. § 41 (2012).
121. See, e.g., Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against
National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proﬁcient Persons, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/special-topics/limitedenglish-proﬁciency/guidance-federal-ﬁnancial-assistance-recipients-title-vi/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3ZHA-ULKP].
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018) (stating that individuals “shall not, on the ground prohibited
under [Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, or the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973] be denied the
beneﬁts of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part
of which is receiving Federal ﬁnancial assistance”). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) also expanded the range and number of entities receiving federal ﬁnancial assistance via large increases in federal spending, such as the advance premium tax credits for marketplace insurance.
123. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018), and other relevant civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination by recipients of federal funds such as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (2018), and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(2018), are also enforceable post hoc in court or by the agency. In the case of Title VI and Title
IX, the Supreme Court has found that the disparate-impact regulations are only enforceable
through administrative complaints. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that plaintiffs could not bring private judicial actions to enforce Title VI’s disparate-impact
regulations). Section 1557 guidance under the Obama Administration attempted to restore
private rights of action for disparate-impact claims. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs & Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,439-440 (May 18, 2016). But some courts declined
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clusion that go beyond nondiscrimination to require the elimination of unjustiﬁed barriers.124 And in other contexts, federal agencies have used their power
under Title VI and federal civil-rights statutes to ensure that federal spending
operates to diminish inequality and promote fair access to federally subsidized
programs.125 Indeed, HHS issued affirmative inclusionary guidance on the location and accessibility of COVID-19-testing sites on the basis of race, ethnicity,
and language.126 The agency also issued disability guidance requiring accommodation and standards of accessibility in the physical structure, location, and aspects of vaccination programs.127
Similar affirmative guidance from HHS and the DOJ might have directed
states to avoid COVID-19 vaccine-distribution mechanisms that exacerbate racial and ethnic inequities, while instructing them on how to improve access. This
could include advising grant recipients to locate vaccination sites in neighborhoods of color most affected by the pandemic or in decentralized accessible sites

124.

125.

126.

127.

to follow this aspect of the guidance, see, e.g., Doe v. BlueCross Blue Shield of Tenn., 926 F.3d.
235, 240-41 (2019), and the issue remains unsettled.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 121 (requiring access to non-English
speakers); FTA Regulation on Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Programs of the Department of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. § 21 (2020) (imposing requirements of nondiscrimination and proactive inclusion on federal grantees). This duty of inclusion builds on the Title
VI disparate impact regulations adopted by twenty-six federal agencies. See 41 C.F.R. § 1016.204-2(a)(2) to (3) (2020) (GSA); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)-(3) (2020) (HHS regulations prohibiting recipients of federal funds from using “criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin”); see also Title VI Legal Manual, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www
.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual7#103 [https://perma.cc/FL6R-Z9TM] (providing examples
of agency rulemaking and guidance to inform grant recipients how to avoid adverse disparate
impacts).
For an account of this phenomenon, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney
General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2012), which describes “equality directives” adopted pursuant to Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018), and the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2018).
See Bulletin: Civil Rights Protections Prohibiting Race, Color and National Origin Discrimination
During COVID-19; Application of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (July 20, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/title-vi-bulletin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DS4T-LCLV] (requiring that grantees ensure that “testing sites are accessible to racial and ethnic minority populations” and specifying that “recipients may consider
making walk-in testing sites available in urban areas where racial and ethnic minority populations may not have access to vehicle transportation, or providing home visitation testing in
rural areas where transportation is a challenge for racial and ethnic minorities”).
See Off. for Civ. Rts., HHS Office for Civil Rights Guidance on Federal Legal Standards Prohibiting
Disability Discrimination in Covid-19 Vaccination Programs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
1 (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/federal-legal-standards-prohibiting-disability-discrimination-covid-19-vaccination.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q79X-8HSU].
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such as pharmacies or large housing providers, to provide transportation or ensure accessibility via public transit, to prioritize residents from particular census
tracts for sign-ups, to allow walk-in or telephone scheduling as an alternative to
internet-based registration, to ensure that registration and outreach materials are
available in multiple languages, and to partner with community groups for outreach to particularly hard-to-reach populations.128
In addition to guiding states and localities in their vaccination plans, federal
agencies can implement these strategies directly in vaccination centers that are
federally funded and operated. COVID-19 federal vaccination efforts have included a retail pharmacy program and direct provision of vaccine doses and
funding to community health centers in key areas.129 Numbers released by the
White House suggest that as of March 2021, federal vaccination sites and federally funded community health centers provided sixty to sixty-ﬁve percent of their
allocated COVID-19 vaccines to people of color. 130 These federal distribution
programs have been funded by the CDC and by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), another section of HHS. 131 Mass vaccination
programs implemented by the Federal Emergency Management Authority
(FEMA) have been part of these efforts, and commentators have suggested ways
to make these programs more equity focused by adjusting allocation processes
to prioritize underserved groups.132
128.
129.

130.

131.

132.
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See supra notes 66-95 and accompanying text (suggesting speciﬁc strategies for increasing
vaccine equity).
See, e.g., FACT SHEET: Biden Administration Announces Historic $10 Billion Investment to Expand Access to COVID-19 Vaccines and Build Vaccine Conﬁdence in Hardest-Hit and Highest-Risk
Communities, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁng-room
/statements-releases/2021/03/25/fact-sheet-biden-administration-announces-historic-10-billion-investment-to-expand-access-to-covid-19-vaccines-and-build-vaccine-conﬁdence-inhardest-hit-and-highest-risk-communities [https://perma.cc/XT2D-KC44].
See id. (announcing further investments in federal community health centers); see also Federally Supported Community Vaccination Centers, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AUTH. (July 6, 2021),
https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support/vaccine-center
[https://
perma.cc/NW2M-D4RH] (delineating types of federally run vaccination facilities, including
distribution at stadiums, hospitals, schools, religious institutions, and mobile vaccination
centers).
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 129; see also Bureau of Primary Health Care, American Rescue Plan
Act Awards, HEALTH RES. & SERV. ADMIN. (Apr. 2021), https://bphc.hrsa.gov/program-opportunities/american-rescue-plan/awards [https://perma.cc/WT7V-5M6B] (showing allocations of more than $6 billion in funds for health centers serving key populations).
See William F. Parker, Govind Persad & Monica E. Peek, Fair Allocation at COVID-19 Mass
Vaccination Sites, 2 JAMA HEALTH F. e210464(1), e210464(1) (2021) (proposing four equityadvancing measures at mass vaccination sites: “(1) preregistration using existing information,
(2) eligibility rules that recognize the greater burden of COVID-19 in underserved neighborhoods, (3) appointment assignment that prioritizes those with disadvantage, and (4) socioculturally informed outreach to lottery selectees”).
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B. Default Equity Plans
One means of inducing states to attend to racial equity is to require them to
ﬁle a vaccine-equity plan with an agency, like the CDC, that employs scientiﬁc
experts with the skills to evaluate such plans and make recommendations. As
part of the CDC’s response to racial disparities in COVID-19 burdens, the agency
appointed a Chief Health Equity Officer and began speciﬁcally collecting and
reporting data on COVID-19 outcomes by race and ethnicity.133 The agency did
not, however, require grant recipients to commit to speciﬁc equity-enhancing
strategies. To enforce such a requirement, Congress could draw on its Spending
Clause authority to attach conditions to ﬁnancial assistance, such as federal aid
to vaccination programs.134 When Congress delegates authority to HHS or the
CDC to administer state funding, the agency might also possess implied (or explicit) statutory authority to set application requirements. The congressional
acts addressing COVID-19135 have allocated more than $67 billion to the CDC
for its COVID-19 response,136 including more than $20 billion to support the
distribution and tracking of coronavirus-vaccine distribution.137 The CDC has
now distributed over $55 billion to states, tribal governments, local governments, and territories in grants and assistance, including more than $7 billion
earmarked for vaccination efforts.138 This includes a series of grants speciﬁcally

133.
134.
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136.
137.
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U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 126.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress can condition federal spending as long as the condition is “germane” to the underlying legislation and the amount of money to which the conditions are attached is not so large as to be unduly “coercive.” See Nat. Fed’n Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (ﬁnding that provisions of the ACA that require states to
expand Medicaid programs to cover all individuals below the age of 65 with incomes below
113% of the federal poverty line constituted a “gun to the head” of states, violating the Spending Clause); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (upholding Congress’s conditioning of 5 of federal-highway funds on states’ raising the drinking age as a “relatively mild
encouragement”).
See, e.g., Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020,
Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146; Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020); Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care
Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-139, 134 Stat. 620 (2020); Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 114 Stat. 600; American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4.
Budget: Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https:
//www.cdc.gov/budget/fact-sheets/covid-19/index.html [https://perma.cc/DU3D-YU7T].
Id.
Budget: CDC COVID-19 Funding, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www
.cdc.gov/budget/fact-sheets/covid-19/funding/index.html [https://perma.cc/B6P5-NGBP]
(showing grant funds per state for COVID-19 purposes, including a breakout for the purpose
of vaccine preparedness).
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intended to promote equity, for which “75% of the total funding must focus
on . . . vaccine access, acceptance, and uptake among racial and ethnic minority
communities; and 60% must go to support local health departments, community-based organizations, and community health centers.”139 If the CDC had required an equity plan as part of the application or reporting for funding, states
would have incentives ex ante to build racial equity concerns into their vaccine
rollout plans.
We propose, however, that the CDC go further than simply asking for an
upfront equity plan, and instead propose a default plan that states can choose or
modify. Although some state-by-state tailoring will be important, the CDC
could offer states a default equity strategy as a starting point. States could then
select the parts of the strategy that they wished to pursue or adopt the default
plan wholesale. The creation of a default plan could save states time as they seek
federal funds, and ensure that states at least consider implementing strategies
that promoted equity effectively in the past. This strategy would not entail withdrawing funds if states departed from their plans. But identifying and publishing states’ equity strategies would ensure that states at least consider equity issues, and it would harness reputational incentives for states to follow through
with their selected strategies.140
C. Data Collection
Data are key to understanding disparities and advancing equity. A core function of the CDC is to conduct surveillance of infectious diseases at the federal
level.141 The process of surveillance, however, relies on voluntary participation
by states. All states require reporting of reportable disease cases, with reportable

139.

CDC Awards $3 Billion to Expand COVID-19 Vaccine Programs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/p0407-covid-19-vaccine-programs.html [https://perma.cc/NK7E-LGSQ].
140. Visible plans can help community-based stakeholders hold states and localities accountable
for progress. Cf. Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66
DUKE L.J. 1771, 1804 (2017) (describing how nongovernmental groups contribute to the implementation of civil-rights goals by monitoring states and localities and engaging with regulatory processes).
141. See What Is Case Surveillance?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 11, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/nndss/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/9DUY-EWNM] (“CDC
monitors about 120 of these notiﬁable diseases and conditions at the national level.”).
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diseases identiﬁed by the state itself.142 Further, the CDC provides states and localities guidance and resources to aid them in their reporting.143 Where the CDC
has also designated a particular disease or infection as notiﬁable,144 states then
provide these reports voluntarily to the CDC, which collects information via the
National Notiﬁable Disease Surveillance System.145 In times of emergency, the
Public Health Services Act allows the CDC to waive the need for additional approvals to request state information.146 Therefore, although state data reporting
to the CDC is still voluntary in emergency circumstances, the agency has more
ﬂexibility in determining what information to request.147
Congressional responses to COVID-19 have allocated additional funding to
the CDC to support the agency’s Data Modernization Initiative, an effort to improve disease surveillance in collaboration with state, local, and territorial governments.148 The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act
allocated $500 million to the CDC to improve data infrastructure,149 with particular efforts to support automated data reporting and electronic transmission
of data.150 If these systems succeed in streamlining the administrative burdens
that may deter states from reporting notiﬁable diseases by race, this will be a
critical public-health investment for monitoring equity in future pandemics.
The CDC has also made efforts to use its grant authority to secure improved
reporting of vaccination data by race and ethnicity. In its 2020 Interim Playbook
142.
143.

144.
145.
146.
147.

148.

149.
150.

See id. (“Each state or territory sets local laws and rules for which diseases and conditions
must be reported.”).
National Notiﬁable Diseases Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nndss/docs/NNDSS-Infographic-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4U238HC].
There are currently about 120 diseases designated as federally notiﬁable. Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 247d(f) (2018).
See Memorandum from Brenda Destro, Deputy Assistant, Sec’y for Plan. & Evaluation on the
Paperwork Reduction Act Waiver During a Public Health Emergency: Distribution of Traceable Opioid Material Kits Across U.S. Laboratories to Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y for Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs. (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=91342001 [https://perma.cc/8QQ4-3KEB]; see also Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944), amended by Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3087, 130
Stat. 1033, 1147 (2016) (adding § 319(f) to the Public Health Service Act, thereby allowing the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to waive requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act for voluntary data collection during times of public-health emergency).
Public Health Data Modernization Initiative, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/covid-19/COVID-19-Data-Modernization-Initiative-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2LT-YPES].
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
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for Jurisdiction Operations for the COVID-19 Vaccination Program, the CDC
directs funding recipients to “address all requirements outlined in the playbook
and clearly describe their responsibility for ensuring activities are implemented.” 151 In order to receive or administer vaccinations, provider facilities
supported by CDC funds must enroll in the federal COVID-19 Vaccination Program, which requires an agreement to “record and report required information”
for every vaccine dose administered.152 This required information, in turn, includes a record of the recipient’s race and ethnicity.153 These types of reporting
requirements are a useful avenue for collecting race-speciﬁc data. Although this
current arrangement extends only to COVID-19 vaccine distribution in CDCfunded programs, regulators could use this strategy more broadly to routinely
mandate demographically disaggregated data on infections and deaths.
The CDC should routinely request information from states that disaggregates both process and outcome data by race and ethnicity.154 When President
Biden took office, his administration placed an increased focus on health equity
with regard to COVID-19. This included establishing a COVID-19 health equity
taskforce, making recommendations to increase data collection that reﬂected race
and ethnicity, and improving responses tailored to the COVID-19 needs and
challenges of particular populations.155 An additional and clarifying step would
be for Congress to authorize the CDC to mandate that states report on diseases
and vaccination explicitly by race or neighborhood, even if the agency could only
exercise that power during an active public-health crisis.
D. Dissemination and Ranking Equity Outcomes
In addition to collecting data on equity-related outcomes, we would also urge
the CDC to report these data publicly on a state-by-state level, allowing for the

151.

152.
153.
154.

155.
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COVID-19 Vaccination Program Interim Operational Guidance Jurisdiction Operations, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 2 (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imzmanagers/downloads/COVID-19-Vaccination-Program-Interim_Playbook.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/TPH6-VZ9B].
Id. at 21.
Id. at 64.
Process data, for example, could include numbers of communities or people reached by outreach efforts, while outcome data in this instance would consist of numbers of people receiving vaccinations.
See National Strategy for Covid-19 Response and Pandemic Preparedness, WHITE HOUSE (Jan.
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Strategy-forthe-COVID-19-Response-and-Pandemic-Preparedness.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HY4A5XWE].
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comparison and ranking of states. Multiple metrics could be used to accommodate different equity deﬁnitions, such as vaccination rates as a proportion of
overall disease burden, as a proportion of population share, or as a proportion of
mortality. Disclosures employing these metrics would increase public focus and
reputational motivations for states to improve the equity outcomes of vaccine
rollout, and it would give community-based advocates the information needed
to encourage improvements. At the start of the rollout, a number of states were
not sharing vaccination data disaggregated by race.156 Efforts to track equity outcomes relied on private actors such as the Kaiser Family Foundation157 or news
outlets.158 As of June 2021, however, most states have included race and ethnicity
information on their public COVID-19 dashboards, though states vary in the
categories they collect and highlight.159 Routine CDC reporting could encourage
states to post their own data by race and ethnicity categories, which would increase transparency. The CDC reporting of state data would be highly visible,
and it would boost the legitimacy, utility, and accuracy of state information. The
CDC does, in fact, report these data for the United States in aggregate (rather
than by state or county, at the time of this writing), but it is limited by variability
and incompleteness in state reporting.160

156.

157.
158.

159.

160.

See, e.g., COVID-19 Vaccinations by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2021), https:
//www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/covid-19-vaccinations-by-race-ethnicity
[https://
perma.cc/74QG-MV7P] (showing that at least ten states were not reporting vaccination by
race or ethnicity as of March 1, 2021); see also How States Collect, Report, and Act on COVID-19
Race and Ethnicity Data, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (July 2, 2021), https://www
.nashp.org/how-states-report-covid-19-data-by-race-and-ethnicity
[https://perma.cc
/W7FX-CXDM] (showing states that report vaccine data disaggregated by race and ethnicity); Caitlin Antonios, Mohar Chatterjee, Georgia Gee, Derek Kravitz, & Kyra Senese, Why
Some States Won’t Share Race and Ethnicity Data on Vaccinations with the CDC—and Why That’s
a Problem, COVID TRACKING PROJECT (Feb. 16, 2021), https://covidtracking.com/analysis-updates/why-some-states-wont-share-race-and-ethnicity-data-on-vaccinations-with-the-cdcand-why-thats-a-problem [https://perma.cc/EQS4-BTJB].
Ndugga et al., supra note 3.
15 States and DC Have Closed at Least Half Their Black Vaccine Gap: Covid-19 Tracker, BLOOMBERG (May 26, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-globaldistribution/us-vaccine-demographics.html [https://perma.cc/9GAG-PBKQ].
See Emily Zylla, Sydney Bernard & Elizabeth Lukanen, State Health & Value Strategies, Ensuring Equity: State Strategies for Monitoring Covid-19 Vaccination Rates by Race and Other Priority
Populations, STATE HEALTH & VALUE STRATEGIES (June 3, 2021), https://www.shvs.org/ensuring-equity-state-strategies-for-monitoring-covid-19-vaccination-rates-by-race-and-otherpriority-populations [https://perma.cc/C8SA-BPSE] (“Almost all states (47), with the exception of Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Wyoming, are now reporting vaccine doses
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CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 4.
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This recommendation would be particularly powerful in conjunction with
state-provided equity plans, as described above. Alongside each state’s equity
outcomes, the CDC could also post the state’s equity plan. If many states adopt
similar strategies or select options from the default plan, the agency could check
off each state’s choices from a list of common strategies. This would facilitate
comparisons between states, and it would give advocates more insight into the
types of equity-promoting strategies that states themselves have planned. It may
also help track which strategies are more effective in promoting equity across
states, which can inform evaluations and ongoing adjustments.
Transparency in reporting is necessary, but insufficient. Experimental studies suggest that adults in the United States are accustomed to racial disparities,
such that publicizing even gross disparities does not draw sustained engagement
or public outrage. Worse, it can invite people to rationalize disparities.161 Still,
even though transparency cannot remedy racial inequity by itself, it is an important complement to all other equity-promoting strategies.
E. Facilitating Information Sharing
Just as the CDC can be a credible hub for vaccine-equity outcome data, it can
also provide a platform for states and localities to share strategies that may be
equity promoting (or that turn out to be equity inhibiting). The CDC has long
run a program identifying “effective behavioral interventions (EBIs)”—programs that have demonstrated effectiveness for preventing HIV.162 The agency
actively identiﬁes programs for different population groups, designates them as
EBIs, and posts information that helps public-health actors identify and adopt
those programs in practice.163 The agency also provides technical assistance to
new program implementers.164
Although the full measure of this approach may not be feasible in pandemic
times, the CDC can provide web space for states and localities to offer equity-
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See, e.g., Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, The Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves:
Racial Disparities and the Persistence of Inequality in the Criminal Justice System, 27 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 183 (2018) (ﬁnding that data about racial disparities in the criminaljustice system often promote stereotypes and justify and rationalize the disparities within that
system).
162. Effective Interventions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 5, 2021), https://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/effective-interventions/index.html [https://perma.cc/ST4L-5MKY].
163. See id.
164. See Capacity Building Assistance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/capacity-building-assistance/index.html [https://perma.cc/PK3X
-EUSS].
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promoting strategy ideas, create a forum for the public to suggest ways to increase equitable distribution, or facilitate information sharing among states
(such as through webinars or discussion groups).165 The CDC could publicize
best or promising vaccine-equity practices for localities, states, and the public,
similar to the efforts the agency has made to identify evidence-based HIV prevention programs. Encouraging the diffusion of best practices could reduce duplicative efforts, increase problem solving, and ultimately promote equitable vaccine distribution.
conclusion
Improving racial equity in vaccine access is a legal, ethical, and practical obligation, particularly in a crisis. In this Essay, we have identiﬁed the tendency for
initial vaccine rollout to be inequality-forcing, rather than equity-building,
drawing on a large body of public-health research documenting the inverse equity hypothesis. COVID-19 vaccination has fallen into this familiar pattern of
early access by the wealthy and white, followed by lagging access by people of
color and the most disadvantaged. We have analyzed ways in which federal
agency guidance and states’ own choices have contributed to exacerbating vaccine inequity, which in turn translates into disparities in COVID-19 disease burden. And we have demonstrated that these choices were not inevitable at the
outset and are not unchangeable now. Federal regulatory tools are available to
increase equitable vaccine distribution, many of which leverage existing authorities that have gone untapped in the COVID-19 response.
Our focus in this Essay has been racial and ethnic equity, which is critical
given the distribution of COVID-19’s burdens. But these strategies can also promote equity along other axes, such as disability, which is already the subject of
speciﬁc CDC guidance. 166 For any underserved group, it would be helpful to
conceptualize equity as measured by vaccine access in relation to the burden of
disease, rather than alternatives such as equal lottery chances of vaccination or
access in relation to population proportion.

165.

The CDC is already providing these venues for some COVID-19 issues. See COVID-19 Webinars and Partner Calls, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 17, 2021), https://
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/communication/videos-webinars-calls.html?Sort
=Date%3A%3Adesc [https://perma.cc/JA3X-RS8Z] (identifying at least twelve CDC-led
webinars intended for federal and state governmental officials since the start of the pandemic).
166. See Vaccines and Immunizations, Jurisdictions: Vaccinating Older Adults and People with Disabilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 14, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/clinical-considerations/older-adults-and-disability/access.html
[https://
perma.cc/8XRD-KZAS].
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For many of our proposals, an enduring beneﬁt of promoting equitable
COVID-19 vaccine distribution is the development of systems and capacity to
deliver health care more equitably in nonpandemic times. Building trust through
community partnerships, local health infrastructure, transparent reporting, and
mobile or decentralized vaccine delivery can provide lasting beneﬁts for access to
other types of health care.
As COVID-19 and other infectious diseases persist, we will continue to learn
what works (and what doesn’t) for rolling out new interventions equitably. By
using regulatory tools and systems designs that build in equity from the start,
we have a much better chance of mitigating inverse equity effects now and in the
next crisis.
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Underhill); Jerome B. Sherman Professor of
Law, Columbia Law School (Johnson). We are grateful to I. Glenn Cohen, Govind
Persad, Bill Sage, and participants in the Cornell Faculty Workshop (including Sara
Bronin, Kevin Clermont, Sherry Colb, Deborah Dinner, Michael Dorf, Maggie Gardner, Valerie Hans, George Hay, Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer, Odette Lienau, Jeff Rachlinski,
Aziz Rana, Jed Stiglitz, Nelson Tebbe, and Ezra Young) for helpful comments on this
work. We note that COVID-19 vaccine-distribution strategies and outcomes will
change over time; we focus here on the early stages of rollout, where inverse equity effects
should be most visible. Professor Johnson’s research for this Essay was funded in part by
the David J. Greenwald Faculty Research Fund.

88

